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Abstract 
Dualization theory posits that certain institutions cause dualization in the labour market, yet 
how institutions deepen the subjective insecurity divide between insiders and outsiders has 
not been examined. This paper examines this question using data from 23 European countries 
in 2008/9. Results show that the subjective employment insecurity divide between permanent 
and temporary workers varies significantly across different countries. Corporatist countries, 
with stronger unions, have larger subjective insecurity divides between permanent and 
temporary workers. However, this is because permanent workers feel more secure in these 
countries rather than because temporary workers are more exposed to feelings of insecurity.  
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Introduction 
The past decade can be characterised by globalisation, increased competition, and the post-
industrialisation of labour markets in Europe. This has had a major impact on the full-
employment model of welfare states, with increased levels of unemployment and long-term 
unemployment (Nickell et al., 2005), and an increase in atypical employment and job 
instability across countries (Auer and Cazes, 2000; Kalleberg, 2000, 2009). This rise in 
insecurity has only been exacerbated by the recent and on-going financial crisis, which 
started in 2008, and the series of austerity measures that followed. For some workers, this 
instability in their labour market position is not a temporary state experienced before moving 
onto a more stable position, but a persistent state that gives rise to a new social class, i.e.,  
‘the precariat’ (Standing, 2011). Indeed, research has shown that the growth of labour market 
vulnerability has not been evenly experienced. There has been a dualization of labour 
markets, with certain groups more exposed to insecurities, while others – the core workforce 
– have been protected (Rueda, 2005; Palier and Thelen, 2010). Labour market institutions, 
which once helped protect workers and their working conditions, are seen as one of the 
causes that have led to the increase in dualization. More specifically, it has been argued that 
dualization is likely to develop in corporatist countries with stronger unions and strict labour 
regulations (Palier and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012b).  
Empirically, studies have used the higher prevalence of outsiders – i.e., the unemployed and 
those in atypical employment – and the limited movement of outsiders into insider positions 
as evidence of such dualization having occurred (e.g., Palier and Thelen, 2010; Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2011; Biegert, 2014). However, given the focus on such objective indicators of 
dualization, not much has been examined in the subjective division between the insiders and 
outsiders. Subjective feelings of insecurity are not solely determined by objective statuses 
(Klandermans et al., 2010). In addition, studies have shown the importance of subjective 
insecurity for individual’s well-being (for a review see, Sverke et al., 2002; Cheng and Chan, 
2008) and for the sustainability of the welfare state (for a review see, Chung and Mau, 2014) 
beyond and above objective statuses. If labour market dualization has truly occurred in 
countries with stronger unions and regulations, not only should there be a prevalence of 
outsiders in these market, but also should we be able to see a significant gap in the subjective 
insecurity between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, literature suggests that we could 
expect this divide to be driven both by the relatively protected positions of insiders and by the 
increased vulnerability of outsiders.  
In sum, this paper examines the role institutions play in explaining the cross-national 
variation in the subjective employment insecurity divide between insiders and outsiders, as 
defined as workers with permanent vs temporary contracts. This is done using a multilevel 
random slopes model and the 4th wave of the European Social Survey from 2008/9. The 
results show that although workers on temporary contracts generally feel less secure about 
their employment than those on permanent contracts, this varies significantly across 
countries. Corporatism and union power can be linked to larger divides in feelings of 
insecurity between the two groups of workers, confirming previous studies that measure 
dualization with objective indicators (e.g., Palier and Thelen, 2010). However, these divides 
are not due to increased exposure of temporary workers to vulnerabilities compared to other 
countries, but due to the relative protection permanent workers enjoy. In other words, 
corporatism and strong unions have been relatively successful in defending a (relatively 
large) proportion of workers from vulnerability, without increasing the insecurity perception 
of outsiders, compared to other countries where both permanent and temporary workers were 
exposed to vulnerable market conditions.  
The next section will define the main concepts used in this paper and its theoretical 
underpinning – namely, subjective insecurity and dualization theories. Theories on the role 
institutions play in shaping labour market dualization outcomes will also be explored. The 
third section examines the data and methods used in the paper, and section four provides the 
findings. The paper ends with conclusions and discussions. 
 
Definitions and Theoretical considerations 
Subjective employment insecurity and role of institutions 
There are several dimensions to subjective job insecurity (Ashford et al., 1989; Näswall and 
De Witte, 2003; Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Klandermans, et al., 2010; Berglund et al., 
2014). Cognitive job insecurity refers to workers’ estimate of the probability that they will 
lose their job in the near future (the informational assessment), while affective job insecurity 
refers to the fear, worry or anxiety stemming from losing one’s job (the emotional response). 
Labour market security concerns workers’ perception of their probability of finding another 
job (with more or less equivalent characteristics) (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007: 214-215), 
and has been also coined as employment or employability security (Berglund, et al., 2014; 
Marx, 2014). It has been argued that cognitive job insecurity is somewhat problematic 
because it cannot distinguish between workers who believe that they are likely to go through 
a (long) period of unemployment with those who do not (Chung and van Oorschot, 2011). 
Workers who believe that they might lose their current job, but will not go through a period 
unemployment because they will find a new job relatively quickly, will be categorised as 
insecure using the cognitive job insecurity definition. Thus, Chung and van Oorschot (2011) 
propose to use the concept ‘cognitive employment insecurity’, defined as the perceived 
likelihood of not having continuous employment in the future. This includes workers who 
believe that they are likely to lose their current job followed by a (long) period of 
unemployment (see also, Herzberg et al., 1959; Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1984).  
While experiences of subjective insecurity may be closely related to a worker’s objective 
insecurity status, it also entails the subjective and psychological reactions to this state. This 
reaction can be affected by personal, organisational and institutional contexts (Greenhalgh 
and Rosenblatt, 1984; Chung and Mau, 2014). In other words, subjective feelings of 
insecurity are not solely determined by objective statuses (Klandermans, et al., 2010) nor will 
the same objective insecurity status result in the same feelings of insecurity. Although there 
are issues with comparing subjective indicators of job quality across time and individuals 
(Osterman, 2013), increasingly studies have shown the importance of examining subjective 
rather than objective insecurity. This is because perceptions of insecurity can better explain 
the impact of insecurity on well-being, and political and policy preferences of workers 
compared to objective indicators of insecurity (Rueda, 2006; Dekker, 2010; Carr and Chung, 
2014).  
A wide range of studies have examined the antecedents and consequences of subjective job 
and employment insecurity (for a review see, Sverke, et al., 2002; Cheng and Chan, 2008; 
Chung and Mau, 2014). For many, the interest lies in how institutions help explain the cross-
national variation in the levels of insecurity (e.g.Böckerman, 2004; Anderson and Pontusson, 
2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; 
Mau et al., 2012), since one of the main purposes of welfare state and labour market 
institutions is to help sustain a certain level of security for its citizens (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Most studies presume an equal impact of institutions across the labour market (Chung 
and Mau, 2014). However, given the different roles institutions have, institutions do not 
necessarily protect all workers equally. What is more, labour market segmentation and 
dualization theorists suggest that certain institutional arrangements are the cause of the 
unequal division of labour market vulnerability across different groups of workers – i.e., 
between insiders and outsiders.  
Labour market dualization and insiders and outsiders 
The main idea behind dual labour market theory (e.g, Doeringer and Piore, 1975; Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1989) is that labour markets are divided into primary and secondary sectors, 
with limited chance for mobility between the two (see Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009). 
Workers in the primary sector, the ‘insiders’, enjoy high wages, good working conditions, 
prospects for career advancement and, most importantly, job stability. On the other hand, 
workers in the secondary market, the ‘outsiders’, have so called ‘dead-end’ jobs, with low-
pay, bad working conditions, few career advancement prospects, and unstable jobs with 
frequent lay-offs (Doeringer and Piore, 1975:70-71; Rueda, 2014). One of the core ideas 
behind these theories is that insiders and outsiders do not compete in the same market. 
Insiders are protected by institutions, whereas outsiders will experience continuous instability 
and will not be able to overcome the barriers that stand between the two markets. Indeed, 
insiders can enjoy the security of the primary market because outsiders act as a buffer from 
the fluctuations in the business cycle (Rueda, 2005). Dualization theorist argue that certain 
institutional configurations make it easier for dual labour market patterns to emerge, and that 
certain institutions can thus be considered the drivers of dualized labour market outcomes 
(Rueda, 2005; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012a; Schwander and 
Häusermann, 2013). Accordingly, the degree of segmentation within the labour market, and 
the insider/outsider divide, varies across welfare regimes with different protection 
mechanisms  (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013; Biegert, 2014).  
It is important to note that there are various definitions of outsiders in the literature. Some of 
the earlier works on dual labour markets focus mostly on the unemployed, distinguishing 
between those in and out of employment (e.g., Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Blanchard and 
Summers, 1987). More recently, one of the most frequently used definition of outsiders 
focuses on the relative vulnerability of workers, usually defined as those who are unemployed 
and in atypical employment – i.e., temporary and involuntary part-time contracts 
(e.g. ,Rueda, 2005, 2006; Emmenegger, 2009; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2011). For the purpose of this study, to be able to measure employment insecurity 
perceptions, I focus only on those currently in employment. This excludes the unemployed 
and students from the definition, as well as the analysis sample. I also exclude involuntary 
part-time work from the definition of outsiders, since part-time work is more relevant when 
dealing with issues of income insecurity rather than employment insecurity. In sum, this 
paper will define insiders and outsiders as workers with and without permanent contracts 
respectively.  
Permanent contracts and subjective insecurity 
Workers on temporary contracts are in general more likely to feel subjectively insecure about 
their job or employment perspectives compared to those with permanent contracts (Näswall 
and De Witte, 2003; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009; Chung and van Oorschot, 2010; 
Klandermans, et al., 2010; see also, Chung and Mau, 2014; Ellonen and Nätti, 2015). This is 
because their contracts are of limited durations – i.e., they can be viewed as objectively 
insecure, and are more at risk of losing their jobs during reorganisation. Although the 
subjective insecurity status of an individual is closely related to their objective insecurity 
status, it entails the subjective and psychological reactions to this insecure status. For 
example, as organisations face economic difficulties – with concomitant redundancies, or 
even threats of closures – the perceived employment prospects of both permanent and 
temporary workers will deteriorate (Klandermans and van Vuuren, 1999; Klandermans, et al., 
2010) increasing feelings of insecurity for both groups. As such, different workplace/sectoral 
contexts can result in variations in the ‘outsiderness’ of temporary workers, where in some 
cases the division between permanent and temporary workers are blurred (Håkansson and 
Isidorsson, 2012). Similarly the extent to which permanent workers and temporary workers 
are divided or united in their subjective insecurity will depend on the national contexts the 
workers are situated in. The next section examines this issue further.  
Role of institutions in increasing insecurity gaps 
The main institutions that are seen to cause divisions in the labour market include industrial 
relations/bargaining structures, employment protection legislation, and training skills 
accumulation processes – such as active labour market policies. All of these institutions 
increase the cost of hiring and firing insiders, which help secure their positions (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1989). They are also the main institutions that are used to explain the cross-national 
variation in job and employment insecurity (Chung and Mau, 2014). They are addressed 
below. 
Industrial relations and corporatism 
Corporatist bargaining – that is when unions cooperate with employer bodies to influence 
policies – is facilitated when unions are responsible for a larger part of the labour market 
through wider collective bargaining coverage and centralised bargaining structures. 
Corporatist bargaining has been linked to good economic performance outcomes (Calmfors 
and Driffill, 1988) through unions and employers working together to build competitive 
advantageous strategies (Katzenstein, 1985; Hall and Soskice, 2001). In these corporatist 
coordinated markets, social partners have also contributed to the diffusion, generalisation and 
institutionalisation of good working condition practices to the wider population (Palier and 
Thelen, 2010: 120), reducing inequalities between different groups of workers. However, in 
recent years, in the midst of liberalisation and external economic pressures, new forms of 
dualism have been seen to form especially in these corporatist countries. Many scholars (e.g., 
Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst, 2007; Palier and Thelen, 2010) argue that in corporatist countries, 
unions were successful in protecting the insiders from the pressures of labour shedding 
strategies through negotiations with employers. However, this was only possible because the 
unions allowed employers to increase flexibility on the secondary market, exposing outsiders 
to increased insecurity, in what can be called a “dual reform” (Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst, 
2007; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013). Emmenegger et al. 
(2012c:310) go on to argue that labour unions have consented to this dualization process, by 
agreeing to social and labour market policies that would negatively affect outsiders while 
protecting insiders. This echoes what has been argued by labour market segmentation 
scholars, for whom stronger unions and centralised collective bargaining hold central roles in 
protecting the labour market positions of insiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Saint-Paul, 
2002). In sum, I expect subjective insecurity divides between permanent and temporary 
workers to be most prevalent in countries with strong unions and centralised collective 
bargaining structures. Dualization theory would assume that this enlarged division in 
corporatist countries will be driven both by the relative protected status of insiders and the 
relatively worse off positions of outsiders, compared to other countries. 
Labour market institutions and institutional dualization 
One way in which dualization has been increased in corporatist countries is through a “two-
tiered reform” (Dolado and Jimeno, 2002) or “flexibility at the margin” approach (Toharia 
and Malo, 2000; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013). This has been 
done through defending employment protection legislation (EPL) for regular workers while 
deregulating the use of flexible contracts. EPL for regular workers protects permanent 
workers from unfair dismissal, thus decreasing their likelihood of job loss, and is likely to 
decrease their subjective employment insecurity. However, because it only covers the rights 
of those on permanent contracts, the impact it has on temporary contract holders will be 
limited (Boeri et al., 2001:21; Rueda, 2005). Moreover, EPL for regular workers can increase 
insecurity for outsiders due to employers’ reluctance to hire people on permanent contracts, 
which results in higher unemployment rates or longer unemployment durations, especially for 
disadvantaged workers (Nickell, 1997; Blanchard, 2006). Stringent EPL has also been linked 
to greater use of temporary contracts (Dolado and Jimeno, 2002; OECD, 2004; Chung, 2005), 
and thus is expected to increase the number of outsiders –i.e., unemployed, temporary 
workers. It can also be expected to impact the subjective insecurity of outsiders by making it 
more difficult to obtain permanent contracts or jobs in general. Since EPL for regular workers 
is likely to increase the feelings of security for permanent workers, it is also expected to 
further widen the gap in subjective insecurity between insiders and outsiders.  
The main role of unemployment benefits (UB) or passive labour market policies (PLMP) is to 
protect individuals from income loss due to losing one’s job. Generous benefits allow 
individuals to stay unemployed without severe consequence to their income security, which 
increases the bargaining power of workers to increase wage levels (Nickell, 1997; Blanchard, 
2006). This protection also decreases one’s fear of the repercussion of unemployment and can 
decrease the worry about losing a job (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). A longer duration of 
PLMP has been criticised as making the unemployed pickier about finding new positions, 
thus prolonging the period of unemployment and consequently increasing unemployment 
rates (OECD, 1994; Nickell, 1997). However, this longer job search period also increases the 
chance that workers will find better fitting jobs (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999) which would 
increase their likelihood of keeping their job. In addition, a longer job search facilitated 
through generous benefits can increase the perceived chance of finding a new job – 
increasing workers’ perceived employability. Active labour market policies (ALMP) offset 
the negative impact of PLMP by increasing the skill set of the unemployed through training 
programmes, by providing assistance in job search activities, and through employment 
generation (Nickell, 1997; Blanchard, 2006). These policies can increase re-employment 
opportunities (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011), thus 
increasing employment security perceptions. 
Unlike EPL, ALMP and, somewhat, PLMP are expected to benefit outsiders more, due to the 
frequent unemployment and insecure labour market positions of outsiders (Boeri et al., 2004; 
Rueda, 2007, 2014). However, in some cases the condition of receiving PLMP benefits is 
based on employment and contribution records. On the other hand, the objective of ALMP is 
to provide stable employment for those without it and can even have a negative influence on 
the bargaining powers of insiders (Rueda, 2014:388). Based on this, Rueda (2014) argues that 
the institutional dualization – or what Emmenegger et al. (2012a) would consider institutional 
dualism - can be measured through EPL for regular workers divided by the ALMP efforts of 
a country. This index represents the degree to which permanent workers are protected 
through employment protection law, and the relative lack of protection provided for outsiders 
– unemployed and temporary employed – through labour market policies. The higher the 
score, the greater is the relative institutional protection for permanent workers. Thus, I expect 
that the subjective insecurity divide between insiders and outsiders will be largest in countries 
with high levels of institutional dualization.  
Socio-economic contexts 
The size of the outsider market – or the share of temporary workers – is also expected to shift 
the relative subjective insecurity position of permanent workers. Examining organisations 
across Spain and Belgium, de Cuyper et al. (2009) argue that the increase in temporary 
workers in an organisation may be perceived as a threat to permanent workers. This is 
because this increase may signal the bad economic situation of a company, may increase 
competition for stable jobs from temporary workers, and may increase work 
load/responsibility of the permanent employed, each factor negatively impacting permanent 
worker’s perceived job security. Similarly, countries with larger number of temporary 
workers are expected to be those where the subjective employment insecurity gaps between 
temporary and permanent workers are smaller, due to the rise in the insecurity perceptions of 
permanent workers. Contrarily, countries with larger shares of temporary workers may be 
those where permanent workers are relatively better protected, and the subjective insecurity 
gap between the two groups are larger. This latter argument is based on studies which 
demonstrate that dualized labour markets – of which large secondary markets may be 
indicative (e.g., Palier and Thelen, 2010; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011) – provide structural 
barriers between the insiders and outsiders markets (Biegert, 2014), further protecting 
insiders. Lastly, economic and labour market conditions have been shown to be some of the 
most influential factors explaining the cross-national variation in job and employment 
insecurity (Erlinghagen, 2008; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011). Thus, the model controls for 
economic and labour market conditions of the country.  
 
Data and Method 
The data used for the analysis is the 4th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). This data 
set covers 28 European countries, namely the EU27 – excluding Austria, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Italy, and Malta – plus Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Norway, Israel, and Switzerland. 
The data was gathered during the early stages of the financial crisis, that is, late 2008 and early 
2009. It is one of the few data sets that covers both a large number of countries and perceived 
employment insecurity of individuals, rather than perceived job insecurity. Secondly, this 
survey includes important background variables, such as human capital characteristics as well 
as individual’s job and company level characteristics, which are not available in other similar 
data sets. Of all the countries included in the ESS, I exclude Croatia, Israel, Russia, Switzerland, 
Turkey and Ukraine from the analysis due to context data availability and problems of 
comparability. Thus, in this paper I include 23 countries: i.e., Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and the United Kingdom. Since I am examining employment insecurity, individuals 
that are currently in paid/dependent employment are relevant. For this reason, I exclude 
respondents who are self-employed, unemployed, sick, retired and/or in education. I also 
exclude those who are above 65 years of age. This leaves a total of 17,023 cases when missing 
cases for the  dependent and independent variables are taken into account. 
The dependent and independent variables 
The dependent variable of this paper is the perceived employment security of individuals. This 
is measured with the following question in the ESS: “How likely is it that during the next 12 
months you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consecutive weeks?”. 
The respondent can answer in a 4 point scale response as “not at all likely”, “not very likely”, 
“likely” or “very likely”. The categories are recoded into a dichotomous variable, where those 
who have answered “likely” and “very likely” to this question are considered as being 
subjectively employment insecure. 
The key independent variable used in this paper is whether or not the respondent has a 
permanent contract. This is measured through “Do/did you have a work contract 
of…unlimited duration, or, limited duration, or, do/did you have no contract?” Those who 
have answered “unlimited duration” are categorized as permanent contract holders, and thus 
insiders. Those with contracts of limited duration or no contracts are considered as temporary 
workers, that is, outsiders. In addition to this variable, the commonly used individual level 
determinants explaining subjective employment and job insecurity are included (e.g., 
Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Mau, et al., 2012; Ellonen and Nätti, 
2015). This includes age, gender, education level, past-training experienced, past 
unemployment experience, existence of a disability, citizenship, family circumstances, 
occupation level, union membership, and size and sector of the company. For the theories 
behind each of these variables see Chung and van Oorschot (2010) and Chung and Mau 
(2014). 
At the national level, industrial relations variables, employment protection legislation, labour 
market policy, and economic and labour market condition variables are included. To measure 
union bargaining power and structure, union density and collective bargaining coverage rate 
are used, both represented as a percentage of wage earners – which indicates bargaining 
power and to a certain degree, corporatism. To measure corporatism in a more direct manner, 
coordination of wage setting index is included, which examines the extent to which 
coordination exist between employers, unions and the state (1 indicating fragmented wage 
bargaining, and 5 indicating centralized bargaining by peak association(s))1. All industrial 
relations variables are from the ICTWSS data set and are for the year 2008 or closest year 
available.  
Employment protection legislation is divided into that for regular workers – the strictness of 
regulation on firing workers on permanent contracts – and for temporary workers – the 
rigidity of regulations on hiring workers on temporary contracts. The data is from the OECD 
and for the year 2008. Labour market policy (LMP) expenditure data is used to measure the 
generosity of the LMP, divided into active labour market policy expenditure (ALMP) – 
including training, employment incentives, direct job creation etc. – and passive labour 
market policy expenditure (PLMP) – benefits given to the unemployed for income 
maintenance. All data is from Eurostat and for the year2008, and is expressed as a percentage 
of the GDP. To take into account the number of people needing these policies, I divide the 
indices with the unemployment rate of that year. Following Rueda (2014), institutional 
                                                 
1 I have also tested bargaining level – 1 indicating individual level, 5 indicating national level – and routine 
involvement – routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic 
policy – but did not find any significant results (see appendix table 2). 
dualization is measured through dividing the EPL for regular workers by the ALMP spending 
divided by the unemployment rate. Two indicators are used to indicate the size of the outsider 
market. First, the share of temporary employed as a percentage of the total dependent 
employed is used. Another is the share of temporary and unemployed as a percentage of the 
total active population. I include unemployment rates for 2008 as an indication of labour 
market conditions at the time of the survey, the GDP growth rate for 2008-2009 to indicate 
economic conditions, and change in unemployment rate from the 2nd quarter of 2008 to the 
2nd quarter of 2009 to indicate labour market condition changes. All context variables have 
been centred and standardized for the models. See Appendix for more details. 
Model 
Two-level random slope multilevel logistic regression models are used for the analysis (see, 
Hox, 2002). Several models are examined. The first model examines the subjective 
employment insecurity divide found between permanent and temporary workers, with and 
without other individual level control variables. The second model tests whether the insecurity 
divide found between permanent and temporary workers varies across countries through a 
random slope model. The third model includes the context variables separately to see if they 
can account for the varying divides across countries. Given the complexity of the model, and 
the lack of level 2 country cases, including too many context variables per model can result in 
biased results (see, Stegmueller, 2013). Thus I restrict the number of context variables per 
model to two or a maximum three using a step-wise approach. I use the meqrlogit function of 
STATA 13.0 for all models. 
 
Results 
Employment insecurity gap between permanent and temporary workers 
Figure 1 shows the employment insecurity levels of permanent and temporary workers across 
23 countries, without having taken into account any individual level controls. Comparing 
permanent workers, workers in Nordic social democratic countries are the least likely to feel 
employment insecure, and workers in the new accession countries and Southern European 
countries are most likely. In almost all countries, permanent workers are on average more 
likely to feel secure about their employment compared to those on temporary contracts or no 
contracts. However, there are large variations across countries. In Cyprus there is no 
difference between permanent and temporary workers (or a very slight difference favouring 
the latter), and in the Netherlands, Romania and Estonia the difference between the two 
groups is less than 10%. On the other hand, in Sweden, Spain, and France, the difference in 
likelihood of feeling employment insecurity for permanent and temporary workers is much 
larger, often being over 30%. 
Figure1 here… 
Through a multilevel model, the statistical significance of the subjective insecurity divide 
between temporary and permanent workers, as well as the cross-national variance of this 
divide is tested. The empty model (Model 0) partitions the variance in the average level of 
employment insecurity across countries to that of the country and the individual levels. Of the 
variance of workers’ employment insecurity perception across the 23 countries in the sample, 
approximately 18% can be attributed to the country they live in. Model 1-1 examines the 
impact of having a permanent contract on workers’ likelihood of feeling employment 
insecure. As expected, as an overall average, those on permanent contracts are less likely to 
feel insecure about their employment. However, this gap decreases somewhat when the 
model includes other individual level variables, as in Model 1-2. This is most likely due to 
the fact that those on permanent contracts are also likely to have higher education, higher 
occupational status or have other characteristics that are linked to lower levels of subjective 
insecurity. Examining some of the individual level variables explaining employment 
insecurity (Appendix Table 1), those with more human capital, i.e., individuals with higher 
education, in higher occupational statuses, and those who have received training in the past 
year are less likely to feel insecure about their employment. Workers over 55, men, and union 
members, the typical profile of insiders of the labour market, are also less likely to feel 
insecure. On the other hand, migrant workers, workers with a disability, and those who have 
experienced unemployment in the past are more likely to feel insecure. There are also 
sectoral variances; workers in manufacturing and construction sectors feel most insecure, 
while workers in public administration, and mining and quarrying sectors feel most secure. 
Lastly, I examine whether the cross-national variance in the insecurity divide between 
permanent and temporary workers is significant through a random slopes model (Model 1-3). 
As expected, the result shows that although workers with permanent contracts are usually less 
likely to feel insecure about their employment compared to those without one, this divide 
varies across countries significantly (variance: 0.182, p<0.05, with a significant reduction of 
log likelihood from model 1-2 to model 1-3). The employment insecurity gap between 
permanent and temporary workers is significantly larger in Sweden, Finland and to a certain 
extent Spain, compared to what is found for the European average, while it is significantly 
smaller in Cyprus, Estonia and Latvia and to a lesser extent Slovenia. In these latter four 
countries, as well as in Hungary and Romania, the subjective employment insecurity gap 
between permanent and temporary workers is insignificant once other individual level 
characteristics are taken into account (See appendix figure 1).  
Table 1 here… 
 
Explaining the cross-national variance  
What can explain the cross-national variance in the subjective employment insecurity divide 
between permanent and temporary workers? As Table 2 shows, Countries with generous 
active and passive labour market policies, with strong unions, and where there are centralised, 
more coordinated bargaining structures, are those where larger insecurity divides are found 
between permanent and temporary workers. Countries with high levels of institutional 
dualization, on the contrary, are those where the subjective insecurity divide between 
permanent and temporary workers is significantly smaller. I do not find a significant 
relationship between the size of the outsider market and the subjective insecurity divide 
between insiders and outsiders. Thus, the countries where dualization is considered to be 
prevalent using objective (static) measures – i.e., where there are larger shares of temporary 
workers or larger shares of those unemployed or in temporary contracts – are not the ones 
where subjective labour market dualization can be observed. Market conditions and the 
severity of the financial crisis – measured here through the unemployment rate for 2008, real 
GDP growth rate for 2009, and the unemployment rate change for 2nd quarters 2008-2009 – 
do seem to influence the overall level of subjective employment insecurity of workers. 
However, the economic and labour market conditions and cycles seem to have had an equal 
impact across the two groups of workers, since no significant relationship is found with these 
variables and the gap in insecurity between permanent and temporary workers.  
Table 2 here… 
To further test the robustness of the indices, the relationship between the institutions and 
market conditions are considered. Bargaining structure variables are highly correlated to one 
another, and to the labour market policy and institutional dualization indices. Thus, some of 
the significant impact of these variables could be driven by other highly correlated factors. 
What is more, it is important to test whether the impact of institutions remain significant 
when controlling for market conditions. To do this, context variables are included in the 
model two at a time, especially focusing on the ones that were shown to be significant in our 
previous models (Appendix Table 3). Collective bargaining coverage, union density, and 
dualization indices remain significant even when other variables are included in the model. 
These three variables also remain significant when controlling for various labour market and 
economic conditions or the size of the outsider market. Coordination index and labour market 
policy generosity indicators, on the other hand, become insignificant when combined with 
other institution or market condition variables.  
Best fit models are found by comparing the reduction in the variance of the random slope (the 
impact of permanent contracts across countries) (Table 3). For the 23 country analysis, the 
model with union density and unemployment rate of 2008 (model 3-1) explains 72% of the 
cross-national variance in the subjective employment insecurity divide between permanent 
and temporary workers. When collective bargaining coverage is included in the model 
(model 3-2), the explained variances rises to 83%. Since including institutional dualization in 
the model reduces the number of countries in the analysis to 19, we also find the best fit 
model for this sample separately. The model including institutional dualization and union 
density (model 3-3) explains 89% of the cross-national variation, and when unemployment 
rate of 2008 is included in the model (model 3-4), the explained variance rises to 100%.  
Table 3 here… 
Summing up, the most important factors driving the subjective employment insecurity divide 
between permanent and temporary workers are union density and institutional dualization, 
and to a lesser extent collective bargaining coverage and unemployment rate. In countries 
with stronger unions with a more centralised bargaining system – and most likely where 
corporatism is prevalent – when faced with bad labour market conditions, insiders felt 
protected to a large degree while outsiders felt relatively exposed. This confirms the thesis 
put forward by Palier and Thelen (2010) and others (Emmenegger, et al., 2012c; Davidsson 
and Emmenegger, 2013) that coordinated market economies – with traditionally centralised 
bargaining and stronger unions – were successful in protecting the insiders from the threats of 
labour shedding, while outsiders were left exposed to the pressures. However, unlike what 
previous studies have posited, the protection of insiders was not necessarily done at the cost 
of outsiders. In other words, temporary workers in countries with stronger centralised unions 
do not feel more insecure about their employment compared to other countries. Rather, the 
divide is due to permanent workers feeling more secure in these countries (see Figure 2). The 
evidence for this can be found when modelling temporary workers separately: union density 
and collective bargaining coverage is not significant in explaining the cross-national variance 
in the subjective employment insecurity for temporary workers, especially when the impact 
of the financial crisis is controlled for. However, both indices significantly explain the cross-
national variation in employment insecurity of permanent workers across countries (Table 3 
& Figure 2).  
The significance of union power and collective bargaining structures in explaining 
employment insecurity divides remains even when employment protection legislation and 
labour market policies are accounted for (see Appendix Table 3). This indicates that the 
influence of unions goes beyond the changes made through labour market institutions. In 
addition, the influence of union power and bargaining structures still holds even when market 
conditions are controlled for. Indeed, only when union strength (and institutional dualization) 
is controlled for, do labour market conditions explain the subjective employment insecurity 
divide between permanent and temporary workers, the divide becoming more pronounced 
when labour market conditions are bad. 
I also find that in countries with high levels of institutional dualization – as operationalised 
by Rueda (2014) – the divide in the feelings of insecurity between insiders and outsiders is 
smaller. Examining this relationship further, I find that while institutional dualization 
significantly increases the level of employment insecurity for permanent workers, it does not 
have an impact on temporary workers (Figure 2 & Table 4). That is, when employment 
protection is stringent, yet not much effort is put in to generating employment and enhancing 
employability of the unemployed, this makes permanent workers feel more insecure about 
their employment while temporary workers feel insecure regardless. Again this relationship 
still holds when market conditions and other institutional factors are controlled for (Appendix 
table 3). This goes against the assumption made by Rueda where high levels of institutional 
dualization should be linked with high levels of dualized market outcomes.  
Table 4 & Figure 2 here… 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
There has been a rise of insecurity across Europe due to new employment risks, including 
increased flexibility in labour markets, globalisation and post-industrialisation. Many argue 
that this increase in insecurity has not been equally distributed across different segments of 
the labour market, the outsiders being more exposed than the insiders. Dualization scholars 
further posit that these developments in dualized labour market outcomes are more prone to 
develop in certain countries and institutional settings – namely the corporatist countries with 
strong unions and regulations (Palier and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger, et al., 2012c; 
Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013).  
The analysis results, using data from 23 European countries in 2008/9, show that although, on 
average, permanent workers feel more secure about their employment compared to temporary 
workers, the subjective employment insecurity divide between the two varies significantly 
across different countries. Similar to what was found by Palier and Thelen (2010), and others 
(Emmenegger, et al., 2012c ; Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013), I find evidence to show 
that corporatist countries with stronger centralised unions are the ones where larger 
differences in subjective employment insecurity can be found between permanent and 
temporary workers. However, and somewhat contrary to the previous dualization research, 
the increased divide in these countries is not at the cost of outsiders. In other words, 
temporary workers do not necessarily feel more vulnerable in these countries compared to 
others. Rather, the divide is driven by the fact that in these countries permanent workers were 
protected from feelings of insecurity. In other countries, without such bargaining structures or 
unions, both permanent and temporary workers were exposed to feelings of insecurity. 
Although the divide between the two groups may be smaller in the other non-corporatist 
countries, the levels of perceived insecurity are high for both types of workers, and on 
average higher than that of the corporatist countries with stronger unions. This leads us to re-
evaluate labour market dualization, and more importantly, the role unions and corporatism 
play in the protection of workers. Although an increased divide between workers can have 
negative implications for solidarity, and can lead to political cleavages (Rueda, 2005, 2006), 
the dualized countries were at least able to protect a (large) portion of their workforce from 
market vulnerabilities compared to other countries. There is also no clear empirical evidence 
to show that this has been done by either reducing the size of the core market – i.e., neither 
collective bargaining coverage nor union density is significantly correlated to the number of 
outsiders in the labour market (unemployed + temporary workers) (Appendix Table 4) – nor 
by exposing outsiders to increased insecurity; i.e., protecting the insider segment of the 
workforce did not provoke a stronger feeling of insecurity amongst the outsiders. Hence, it is 
worthwhile reassessing the role of unions, highlighting the positive role they played in the 
protection of workers. Rather than focusing on the fact that strong unions in corporatist 
countries consented to the increase in dualization (Emmenegger, et al., 2012b) which 
emphasizes the deterioration of working conditions of outsiders, we should focus on the 
important role unions had in protecting a large proportion of workers from labour market 
vulnerability, not observed in non-corporatist countries where unions were weak.  
Institutional dualization – as operationalised by Rueda (2014) – can also explain why there 
are larger subjective insecurity divides between workers with and without permanent 
contracts. However, contrary to what was expected, countries where there are higher levels of 
institutional dualization – that is, where it is hard to fire permanent workers while not much is 
done for employment/employability generation for the unemployed – are those where the 
divides in subjective insecurity are the smallest. This is driven by the fact that permanent 
workers feel more insecure in these countries, while temporary workers feel as insecure as in 
other countries. This indicates that even when protected by stringent employment protection 
laws, even those on permanent contracts are prone to feel more insecure about their 
unemployment and reemployment prospects when there is insufficient support available for 
the unemployed. This is because EPL does not help in protecting workers – either permanent 
or temporary – from feelings of insecurity. On the other hand, countries with high levels of 
ALMP and PLMP are those where feelings of insecurity are low for both permanent and 
temporary workers. Given the implications subjective vulnerability has on policy support and 
political preferences (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Marx, 2014; Paskov and Koster, 2014), 
protecting EPL at the cost of developing generous labour market policies may not be 
politically fruitful as assumed. Another point to raise from this result is the discrepancy found 
between institutional dualization and dualized market outcomes. This shows that dualization 
processes, outputs and market outcomes do not always mirror one another and should not be 
assumed to do so (see also, Chung, 2012).  
There are several limitations to this paper. Firstly, I only focus on contract status to 
distinguish between insiders and outsiders, which is just one of many types of definitions that 
can be used to measure labour market divisions. Further, many studies have shown that 
contract status may not be the best way to measure dualization processes in non-corporatist 
countries (Yoon and Chung, 2015). This mean that results may change when other definitions 
of outsiders are examined, a point that should be explored in future studies. Secondly, there 
are limitations in some of the variables used here to measure complex concepts. For example, 
we assume corporatism to take place in countries with high union density and collective 
bargaining coverage, yet were not able to measure corporatism directly. Further, there may be 
issues with the comparability of some institutional variables – such as union density – due to 
the different ways in which these variables are measured across countries. This studies is not 
able to address this point directly, yet is another area future studies should be mindful about. 
Finally, this paper has focused on the different national contexts in which the subjective 
divide between permanent and temporary workers vary. However, this divide may also vary 
depending on the occupational and sectoral contexts (Lautsch, 2002; Klandermans, et al., 
2010; Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2012). This study was not able to examine this issue in 
much detail, and future studies should examine the organisational and sectoral contexts in 
which such blurring may occur. 
Such caveats notwithstanding, this paper provides important points for future studies that aim 
to empirically address dualization across different welfare states. The results demonstrate that 
there are discrepancies between objectively measured dualized market outcomes – as 
measured through the size of unemployed/temporary employed – and subjectively measured 
dualized market outcome – measured through employment insecurity gaps between insiders 
and outsiders. Although workers on permanent contracts generally tend to feel more secure 
about their employment, the extent to which they feel (more) secure varies largely across 
countries: in some countries there is more of a blurring between the two groups of workers. 
The intensity of the ‘insiderness’ of permanent workers should thus be complimented with 
the use of subjective measures, such as subjective employment insecurity as used here. It is 
the subjective perception of individuals that have larger implications for well-being and 
policy/political preferences (e.g., Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Dekker, 2010; Carr and Chung, 
2014; Marx, 2014; Paskov and Koster, 2014). Thus, our focus needs to move beyond 
assumptions as to the utility of objective indicators to consider more direct subjective aspects 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure1. Subjective employment insecurity gap between non-permanent and permanent 
workers across 23 European countries for 2008/9  






































































































































 Figure2. Subjective employment insecurity divide between permanent and temporary workers across different institutional contexts across 23 / 
19 countries(for the graph with institutional dualization), in 2008/2009  
































































Table 1. Explaining subjective employment insecurity of individuals across 23 European 
countries with contract type 






 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Permanent contract 
  -1.169*** 0.046 
-
0.912*** 
0.051 -0.891*** 0.104 
Constant -1.129
*** 0.179 -0.260 0.188 0.366 0.222 0.353 0.203 
         
Variance country level 0.726
*** 0.217 0.780*** 0.233 0.667*** 0.201 0.468*** 0.151 
Variance individual level 𝜋
2/3        
Variance permanent       0.182
* 0.072 
Explained variance country 
level 
ICC=18.1% -7.4% 8.2% 35.6% 
Loglikelihood -8665.157 -8337.960 -7711.311 -7692.893 
N level 1 (individuals) = 17032 , N level 2 (countries) = 23 
a: Model 2 controls for variables such as age, sex, education, training experience in the last 12 months, 
unemployment experience in the past five years, existence of a disability, citizenship, whether or not the 
individual has a partner in paid work, a child or children in the household, occupation, currently belonging to a 
trade union, and size and sector (NACE 13 + public/private) of the company the individual is employed in. Full 
models in Appendix. 
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 
Table 2. The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-national variance in the level of subjective employment insecurity and the divide 













































0.073 0.127 -0.334* -0.353** 0.185€ -0.289* -0.234€ -0.250€ -0.243 0.067 0.322* -0.378** 0.398** 
Macro factor*permanent 0.011 0.086 -0.231* -0.194* 0.275*** -0.295** -0.273** -0.242** -0.143 -0.018 - 0.083 -0.109 0.073 
Permanent -1.004*** -1.025*** -0.893*** -0.888*** -1.013*** -0.879*** -0.895*** -0.883*** -0.883*** -0.892*** - 0.882*** -0.885*** -0.884*** 
              
Variance country level 0.269** 0.260** 0.329** 0.324** 0.203*** 0.370** 0.403** 0.390** 0.401** 0.463*** 0.374** 0.339** 0.328** 
Variance permanent 0.165* 0.158* 0.121* 0.136** 0.069 0.088* 0.100* 0.119* 0.157** 0.181** 0.181* 0.166* 0.176** 
Exp. Var. level 2 
(from model0) 
49.0% 50.7% 54.7% 55.3% 61.4% 49.0% 44.5% 46.3% 44.8% 36.2% 48.5% 53.3% 54.9% 
Exp. Var. level 2 
(from model3) 
2.1% 5.2% 29.7% 30.6% 25.9% 20.8% 13.8% 16.6% 14.2% 1.0% 20.1% 27.5% 29.9% 
Exp. Var. random slope: 
permanent (from model 3) 
0.1% 4.2% 33.5% 25.3% 58.4% 51.6% 44.9% 34.6% 14.0% 0.4% 0.8% 8.9% 3.6% 
Log likelihood -6362.1315 -6361.6105 -7685.7088^ -7686.4724^ -6356.0383^ -7684.8766^ -7686.2882^ -7687.2597 -7689.6539 -7692.767 -7689.5665 -7688.3617 -7688.351 
Level 2 N 19 23 19 23 
Level 1 N 14706 17032 14706 17032 
Each column represents a separate model, where one context variable is included as a main effect on employment insecurity, as well as an interaction term with permanent 
contract. All models include the individual level variables as in model 3.  All level 2 variables are centred and standardized.  
For models including EPL and institutional dualization, different baseline models were calculated based on 19 country cases - excluding Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia and 
Romania. 
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10, ^ denotes the models where the log likelihood reduction from nested model (model 1-3) is significant at the 0.05 level  
  
Table 3. The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-national variance in the level of 
subjective employment insecurity and the divide between permanent and non-permanent 
workers 
 Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4 
Collective bargaining cov.  - 0.299€   
Collective bar. cov.*perm  - 0.149€   
Union density - 0.105 0.053 - 0.040 0.114 
Union density * perm - 0.387*** - 0.304*** - 0.260*** - 0.363*** 
Institutional Dualization   0.161 0.229€ 
Institutional Dual. *perm   0.161* 0.134* 
Unemployment rate 2008 0.286€ 0.330*  0.304** 
Unemploy.rate*perm - 0.249*** - 0.213**  - 0.198*** 
Permanent  -0.877*** -0.875*** -1.025*** -0.982*** 
     
Variance country level 0.392** 0.318** 0.190** 0.164** 
Variance permanent 0.051 0.031 0.018 0.000 
Exp. Var. level 2(from model0) 46.1% 56.3% 64.0% 68.8% 
Exp. Var. level 2(from model3) 16.2% 32.1% 30.9% 40.1% 
Exp. Var. random slope: 
permanent (from model 3) 
71.9% 82.9% 89.1% 100.0% 
Log likelihood -7681.5848 -7677.2699 -6350.0758^ -6343.1007^ 
Level 2 N 23 19 
Level 1 N 17032 14706 
All models include the individual level variables as in model 3.  All level 2 variables are centred and 
standardized. For models including EPL and institutional dualization, different baseline models were calculated 
based on 19 country cases - excluding Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia and Romania. 
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10, ^ denotes the models where the log likelihood reduction 
from nested model (model 2-5, model 3-3) is significant at the 0.05 level  
 
Table 4. Impact of institutions on the subjective employment insecurity of permanent and 
temporary workers modelled separately 











ALMP -0.576*** -0.488*** -0.326* -0.259* 
PLMP -0.556*** -0.485*** -0.350** -0.303** 
Institutional dualization 0.509*** 0.592*** 0.199 0.199 
Union density -0.512*** -0.482*** -0.213 -0.197 
Collective bar. cov. -0.607*** -0.510*** -0.288* -0.213 
Coordination -0.509**  -0.244€  
Unemployment rate 0.235  0.295*  
GDP growth rate -0.494**  -0.345*  
Unemployment change 0.480**  0.377**  
Each cell on the 2nd – 5th columns represents a separate model, where the context variable is included in the model with the 
sample of permanent or temporary workers separately (2nd, 4th columns), and where it is included having controlled for GDP 
growth rate of 2009 as an indicator of the severity of the crisis (3rd, 5th columns). 
All models include the individual level variables as in model 3.  All level 2 variables are centred and standardized.  
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.010 
  
[Appendix for Dualization and vulnerabilities of workers] 
Appendix 1: Independent variables 
Individual level characteristics 
 Demographic & Human capital variables 
- Age – 4 categories- 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 (reference: 34-44) 
- Sex – female dummy (reference: male) 
- Education – lower secondary or below, upper secondary, tertiary or above (reference: 
upper secondary) 
- Training received in the past year 
- Previous unemployment experience – had an unemployment experience of 3month 
or more in the past five years 
- Disability – daily life hampered by illness or disability 
- Citizenship-citizen of the country of residence  
 Family structure 
- Having a partner in paid work  
- Having dependent child(ren)  
 Employment & workplace characteristics 
- Occupation level – Legislators, senior officers and managers, Professionals, 
Technicians and associate professionals, Clerks, Service worker and shop and market 
sales worker, Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, Crafts and Related Trade 
workers, Plant and machine operators and assemblers, Elementary occupations and 
Armed forces (reference: Service worker and shop and market sales worker) 
- Permanent contract  (reference: temporary or no contract) 
- Currently a union member  
- Size of company  - under 10, 10 to 24, 25 to 99, 100 to  499, 500or more (reference 
under 10) 
- Sector – NACE13 category – Agriculture forestry and fishing, Mining and quarrying, 
Manufacturing, Electricity gas and water, Construction, Retail and repair, Hotel and 
restaurants, Transport storage and communication, Financial intermediation, Real 
estate renting and business activities, Public administration and defence, Education, 
health and social work, and Other services (reference Manufacturing) 
 
National level variables 
 EPL(All data from OECD: 
 http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm) 
- EPL overall: Employment protection overall, including Individual dismissal of workers 
with regular contracts, Additional costs for collective dismissals, and Regulation of 
temporary contracts 
- EPL regular workers: Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, 
incorporating (i) procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the 
dismissal process; (ii) notice periods and severance pay; and (iii) difficulty of dismissal, 
as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well 
as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair. 
- EPL index for temporary workers: including regulation of fixed-term and temporary 
work agency contracts with respect to the types of work for which these contracts are 
allowed and their duration, as well as regulation governing the establishment and 
operation of temporary work agencies and requirements for agency workers to 
receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm, which 
can increase the cost of using temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers on 
permanent contracts. 
 Labour market policies (All data from EUROSTAT: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat and for 
2008) 
- National expenditure on labour market policy as a percentage of GDP divided by the 
unemployment rate  
- National expenditure on passive labour market policy as a percentage of GDP divided 
by the unemployment rate  
- National expenditure on active labour market policy as a percentage of GDP divided 
by the unemployment rate  
 Institutional Dualization (based on Rueda 2014) 
- EPL regular workers 2008 ÷ (ALMP spending as % of GDP 2008/unemployment rate 
2008) 
 Bargaining power/structure (All data from ICTWSS: http://www.uva-aias.net/208 for 
2008 or latest) 
- Collective bargaining coverage: employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining 
agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the 
right to bargaining, expressed as percentage  
- Union density : net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in 
employment  
- Bargaining level : The predominant level(s) at which wage bargaining takes place (5 = 
central or cross-industry level; 4 = intermediate or alternating between central and 
industry bargaining; 3 = sector or industry level; 2 = intermediate or alternating 
between sector and company bargaining; 1 = local or company level)  
- Coordination of wage-setting : (5 = a) centralized bargaining by peak association(s), 
with or without government involvement, and/or government imposition of wage 
schedule/freeze, with peace obligation (example: Sweden prior to 1980); b) informal 
centralisation of industry-level bargaining by a powerful and monopolistic union 
confederation (example Austria prior to 1983;c) extensive, regularized pattern setting 
and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with coordination of bargaining by 
influential large firms (Japan prior to 1998). 4 = a) centralized bargaining by peak 
associations with or without government involvement, and/or government imposition 
of wage schedule/freeze, without peace obligation (example: Ireland 1987-2009); b) 
informal (intra-associational and/or inter-associational) centralisation of industry and 
firm level bargaining by peak associations (both sides) (example Spain 2002-8; c) 
extensive, regularized pattern setting coupled with high degree of union 
concentration (example: Germany most years). 3 = a) informal (intra-associational 
and/or inter-associational) centralisation of industry and firm level bargaining by peak 
associations (one side, or only some unions) with or without government participation 
(Italy since 2000); b) industry-level bargaining with irregular and uncertain pattern 
setting and only moderate union concentration (example: Denmark 1981-86); c) 
government arbitration or intervention (example: U.K 1966-8, 1972-4) 2 = mixed 
industry and firm-level bargaining, with no or little pattern bargaining and relatively 
weak elements of government coordination through the setting of basic pay rates 
(statutory minimum wage) or wage indexation (example France most years).1 = 
fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants (example 
U.K. since 1980). 
- Routine Involvement: routine involvement of unions and employers in government 
decisions on social and economic policy.(2 = full concertation, regular and frequent 
involvement; 1 = partial concertation, irregular and infrequent involvement; 0 = no 
concertation, involvement is rare or absent) 
 Economic conditions (all data from EUROSTAT) 
- Share of temporary workers as a proportion of the total employed for 2008  
- Share of temporary workers and unemployed as a proportion of total active 
population 2008  
- Unemployment rate for 2008 
- GDP growth rate 2008-2009 




Appendix Table 1. Explaining employment insecurity of individuals across 23 European 
countries  
 Model 2 Model 3 
 +ind. level variables +random slope 
 B s.e. B s.e. 
Permanent contract -0.912*** 0.051 -0.891*** 0.104 
Age (Reference: 35-44)     
   15-24 -0.032 0.083 -0.078 0.084 
   25-34 -0.022 0.058 -0.029 0.058 
   45-54 -0.062 0.057 -0.062 0.057 
   55-64 -0.357*** 0.072 -0.344*** 0.072 
Female 0.184*** 0.047 0.175*** 0.047 
Education (Reference: Upper- and post-secondary)     
   Primary, low secondary 0.142* 0.059 0.154** 0.059 
   Tertiary education -0.198*** 0.059 -0.202*** 0.059 
Training past 12 months -0.181*** 0.048 -0.167*** 0.048 
Unemploy. Exp. Past 5 years 0.950*** 0.054 0.947*** 0.054 
With a disability 0.395*** 0.059 0.393*** 0.059 
Citizen -0.486*** 0.091 -0.475*** 0.092 
Partner in paid work -0.040 0.044 -0.037 0.044 
Have a child -0.031 0.046 -0.031 0.047 
Occupational level(Ref: Service and sales workers)     
   Legislators, senior officers and managers -0.481*** 0.110 -0.478*** 0.110 
   Professionals -0.461*** 0.094 -0.464*** 0.094 
   Technicians and associate professionals -0.069 0.079 -0.066 0.079 
   Clerks -0.048 0.085 -0.047 0.085 
   Crafts and Related Trade workers 0.148 0.090 0.147 0.090 
   Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.315*** 0.095 0.310*** 0.096 
   Elementary occupations 0.393*** 0.085 0.379*** 0.085 
   Skilled agricultural /fishery workers and Armed forces -0.103 0.199 -0.101 0.199 
Public company -0.134 0.073 -0.142 0.073 
Currently a union  member -0.205*** 0.058 -0.189*** 0.058 
Company size (Reference – less than 10)     
   10 to 24 -0.021 0.058 -0.028 0.058 
   25 to 99  -0.004 0.058 -0.014 0.058 
   100 to  499  -0.016 0.069 -0.025 0.069 
   500or more -0.137 0.084 -0.151 0.085 
Sector (Reference: Manufacturing)     
   Agriculture forestry and fishing -0.310* 0.151 -0.319* 0.151 
   Mining and quarrying  -0.808** 0.301 -0.813** 0.300 
   Electricity gas and water -0.545** 0.196 -0.559** 0.197 
   Construction -0.090 0.086 -0.088 0.086 
   Retail and repair -0.255** 0.080 -0.254** 0.080 
   Hotel and restaurants -0.339** 0.112 -0.342** 0.112 
   Transport storage and communication  -0.280*** 0.091 -0.293*** 0.092 
   Financial intermediation -0.312* 0.134 -0.312* 0.134 
   Real estate renting and business activities -0.271** 0.090 -0.268** 0.090 
   Public administration and defence  -0.772*** 0.114 -0.772*** 0.114 
   Education -0.481*** 0.114 -0.496*** 0.114 
   Health and social work  -0.542*** 0.100 -0.557*** 0.100 
   Other services -0.474*** 0.102 -0.491*** 0.102 
Constant 0.366 0.222 0.353 0.203 
     
Variance country level 0.667*** 0.201 0.468*** 0.151 
Variance individual level     
Variance permanent   0.182* 0.072 
Explained variance country level 8.2%  35.6%  
N level 1 (individuals) = 17032 , N level 2 (countries) = 23 
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 
 
  
Appendix Table 2. The impact of Bargaining structures in explaining the cross-national 
variance in the level of employment insecurity and the gap between permanent and non-
permanent workers 










      
Main effect 
(Macro factor) 
-0.289* -0.234€ -0.162 -0.250€ -0.266€ 
Macro factor*permanent -0.295** -0.273** -0.135€ -0.242** 0.030 
Permanent -0.879*** -0.895*** -0.950*** -0.883*** -0.891*** 
      
Variance country level 0.370** 0.403** 0.415** 0.390** 0.403** 
Variance permanent 0.088* 0.100* 0.148* 0.119* 0.183* 
Explained variance level 2 
(from model0) 
49.0% 44.5% 42.9% 46.3% 44.5% 
Explained variance level 2 
(from model2) 
20.8% 13.8% 11.3% 16.6% 13.9% 
Explained variance random 
slope: permanent  
51.6% 44.9% 18.7% 34.6% -0.2% 
Level 2 N 23 
Level 1 N 17032 
Each column represents a separate model, where one context variable is included as a main effect on 
employment insecurity, as well as an interaction term with permanent contract. All models include the 
individual level variables as in model 3.  All level 2 variables are centred and standardized.  
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.010 
  
  
Appendix Table 3. The impact of institutions in explaining the cross-national variance in the level of subjective employment insecurity and the 
gap between permanent and non-permanent workers (included in combination) 
 
A 
   
 
 


















EPL for regular n.s. A(-)€ n.s. A(+)*** A(-)***   A(-)***  B(+)€ A(-)€ n.s. n.s. n.s. 
EPL for temporary  A(-)€ n.s. A(+)*** A(-)***   A(-)***  B(+)* A(-)* n.s. n.s. n.s. 
ALMP spending   n.s. A(+)** A(-)* A(-)* n.s. A(-)*  B(-)* B(-)* B(-)* 




   
A(-)***  
B(+)* 
A(-)*  B(+)** B(+)** B(+)*** B(+)*** B(+)*** 
Union density 
 







     B(-)* B(-)*** B(-)*** B(-)*** 
Coordination        B(-)** B(-)** B(-)** 
Notes: Entries are results from 33 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level characteristics)  
A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column A is significant), n.s. represents when both variables are insignificant. 
The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model. Shaded box represents the best fit model (model with Institutional dualization, union density explains 89.1% of the variance for 
19 countries; model with union density and collective bargaining coverage explains 68.3% of the variance for 23 countries; model with union density and unemployment rate of 2008 explains 
71.9% of the variance for 23 countries) 
The model with institutional dualization, union density and unemployment rate 2008 explains 100.0% of the total variance of the random slope of permanent workers in 19 countries. 
The model with union density, collective bargaining coverage, and unemployment rate 2008 explains 82.9% of the total variance of the random slope of permanent workers in 23 countries.  
a : direct comparison not possible with models with Institutional dualization (due to the different number of country cases for this variable) 























EPL regular  1.00             
EPL temp.  0.30 1.00            
ALMP/unemp 
-




0.11 -0.18 0.89 1.00         
 
Collective bargaining cov. 0.35 0.08 0.52 0.60 1.00         
Union density 
-
0.16 -0.32 0.54 0.43 0.55 1.00       
 
Coordination 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.53 1.00       
Unemp. % 2008 0.14 0.31 -0.44 -0.26 -0.02 -0.40 -0.11 1.00      
GDP growth 08-09 0.00 0.12 0.29 0.24 0.35 0.13 0.23 0.06 1.00     
Unemployment change 08-09 
-
0.21 0.00 -0.26 -0.17 -0.45 -0.29 -0.21 0.21 -0.76 1.00   
 
Share of Temp workers 0.39 0.23 0.18 0.29 0.47 0.02 0.26 0.29 0.55 -0.23 1.00   
Share of outsiders in the 
market 0.39 -0.02 -0.13 -0.12 0.17 -0.20 -0.03 0.23 0.22 -0.05 0.45 1.00 
 
Institutional Dualization 0.14 0.15 -0.70 -0.66 -0.47 -0.50 -0.45 0.08 -0.57 0.38 -0.34 -0.04 1.00 




Appendix Figure 1. Cross-national variance in the subjective employment insecurity gap 
between insiders and outsiders (having controlled for individual and workplace 
characteristics) – sorted by the likelihood gap  
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